We show how directors can set the strength of a firm's anti-takeover provisions in order to influence the investment-timing decision of a future empire-building CEO. The prospect of future hostile takeover attempts, which terminate the CEO's control benefits if successful, affects the CEO's...

Using detailed project-level data, we document a novel mechanism through which information externalities distort investment. Firms anticipate information spillover from peers’ investment decisions and delay project exercise to learn from their peers’ outcomes. To establish a causal...

We consider a real options model for the optimal irreversible investment problem of a profit maximizing company. The company has the opportunity to invest into a production plant capable of producing two products, of which the prices follow two independent geometric Brownian motions. After...

This paper presents evidence of the negative combined effect of financial constraints and real options on corporate investment. Using panel data on public companies functioning in developed countries, the authors prove that with increasing uncertainty surrounding a firm, the real options effect...

We present a model of firm investment under uncertainty and partial irreversibility in which uncertainty is represented by a jump diffusion. This allows to represent both the continuous Gaussian volatility and the discontinuous uncertainty related to information arrival, sudden changes and large...