This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activities by a Competition Authority (CA). We distinguish three sets of interventions: (a) detecting, prosecuting and penalizing cartels; (b) actions that aim to stop cartel activity in the short-term,...

We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...

The main goal of this academic paper is to provide an assessment of the current Antitrust regulatory framework in Serbia along with an analysis of Antitrust Commission practice in this field. This paper comprises of five sections. The first section focuses on the general provisions of Antitrust...

The protection of a "system of undistorted competition" within the internal market is one of the core elements of EU law that institutionalizes economic integration. The addressees of the prohibitions regarding restraints of competition such as Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are "undertakings". Hence...

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with...

In Katsoulacos et al. (2015) we examined the welfare properties of a number of monetary penalty regimes for tackling cartels, including revenue-based penalties, the most widely used regime. We showed that for a typical industry overcharge-based penalties welfare-dominate the others. However...