This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...

This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...

This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...

This paper argues that contracts induced by means of bribery should be valid. Nullity and voidability decrease the incentive for voluntary disclosure, assist corrupt actors with enforcing their bribe agreements and provide leeway for abuse. Thus, they run counter to effective anti-corruption. It...

I consider transactions involving asymmetric prisoners dilemmas between pairs of players selected chosen from two large populations. Games are played repeatedly, but information about cheating is not adequate to sustain cooperation, and there is no official legal system of contract enforcement....

This paper argues that contracts induced by means of bribery should be valid. Nullity and voidability decrease the incentive for voluntary disclosure, assist corrupt actors with enforcing their bribe agreements and provide leeway for abuse. Thus, they run counter to effective anti-corruption. It...

We relate the design of contract law to the process of development. In this paper, contract law defines which private agreements are enforceable (i.e. are binding and enforced by courts) and which are not. Specically, we consider an economy where agents face a hold-up problem (moral hazard in...

When should laws be enforced by private actors and when should society rely on law enforcement by public authorities? This question has been analyzed in great detail in law & economics scholarship. This article surveys the literature and outlines a framework of criteria for deciding whether...

Contracting parties (e.g., the firm and its supplier) have cost-reducing incentives to make investments which support the unique transactions between them. However, to the extent that one party may renege on its contractual obligations, the other party incurring the cost of the...

This article argues that the enforcement in England in Re New Cap Reinsurance Corporation of an Australian monetary judgment rendered under Australian insolvency law does not sit easily with the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. This is because the Foreign Judgments...