Like other network industries, the European gas supply industry has been liberalised, along the lines of what has been done in the United Kingdom and the United States, by opening up to competition the upstream and downstream segments of essential transmission infrastructure. The aim of this...

We analyze a market game where firms choose capacities under uncertainty about future market conditions and make output choices after uncertainty has unraveled. We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under imperfect competition and establish that capacity choices by strategic firms are...

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...

We use a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit with store-type differentiation to evaluate how entry regulations affect profitability, market structure and welfare. Based on unique data for all retail food stores in Sweden, we estimate demand, recover variable profits, and estimate entry...

We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price...

In a simple model of network industry, where an upstream monopolis t provides an essential input for downstream service supply, we analyze the competitive settings arising in the downstream market under alternative regulatory frameworks; we combine structural (i.e. vertical integration,...

This paper studies entry and capacity decisions by dialysis providers in the U.S. We estimate a structural model where providers make strategic continuous choices of capacities based on private information about own costs and beliefs about competitors' behaviors. We evaluate the impact on market...

I develop a structural model of mortgage demand and lender competition to study how leverage regulation affects the equilibrium in the UK mortgage market. Using variation in risk-weighted capital requirements across lenders and across mortgages with differential loan-to-values, I show that a...

We use a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit with store-type differentiation to evaluate how entry regulations affect profitability, market structure and welfare. Based on unique data for all retail food stores in Sweden, we estimate demand, recover variable profits, and estimate entry...

The study explores the effects on social coverage of services that will potentially be brought about as a result of Mexico's recent Telecommunications Reform. Specifically, the Reform (a) aims to introduce regulation to boost competition, and thereby bridge the market efficiency gap; (b) propose...