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Do excessive legal standards discourage desirable activity?
Shavell, Steven - In: Economics letters 95 (2007) 3, pp. 394-397
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003476313
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A fundamental enforcement cost advantage of the negligence rule over regulation
Shavell, Steven - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625182
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Do excessive legal standards discourage desirable activity?
Shavell, Steven - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003292432
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On the social function and the regulation of liability insurance
Shavell, Steven - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001459739
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A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation
Shavell, Steven - In: The Rand journal of economics 15 (1984) 2, pp. 271-280
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001013169
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A fundamental enforcement cost advantage of the negligence rule over regulation
Shavell, Steven - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009633263
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Liability of harm versus regulation of safety
Shavell, S. - 1983
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002797156
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Liability for harm versus regulation of safety
Shavell, Steven - 1983
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002797146
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A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation
Shavell, Steven - 1983
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002797177
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A model of the socially optimal use of liability and regulation
Shavell, Steven - 1983
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002797194