We show that public companies frequently changed their board structures before implementation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, with two-thirds of firms changing board size or independence during an average two-year period. Board changes were associated with changes in firm-specific fundamentals, but...

We study the effect of state control on capital allocation and investment in China, where the government screens prospective stock issuers. We find that state firms are more likely to obtain government approval to conduct seasoned equity offerings than non-state firms. Further, non-state firms...

We study shareholder support for corporate board nominees before and after the 2018 California gender quota. Pre-quota, new female nominees received greater support than new male nominees, consistent with women being held to a higher standard. Post-quota, as the number of women increased,...

Decline in confidence in free market mechanisms in the past decade has provoked an increase in interest in regulatory issues. This paper seeks to answer one question: Are exchange listing rules an effective screening mechanism? Using a sample of IPO firms listing on major U.S. exchanges in...

At a time of such great turbulence, looking to the future directions of capital markets and their regulation in developed economies is a particularly risky business. We are in the midst of a great sea change.Nevertheless, there are several current, and readily observable, phenomena which are...

We examine the political dynamics which led to the codification of the Principles and Standards for sound compensation practices at financial institutions at international (G 20) level and to their subsequent implementation on both sides of the Atlantic. We show that the regulation of bankers'...

Combating managerial opportunism is a difficult task. Managers do not tend to sit idle when facing a regulatory attempt to restrict their activities. They often seek ways to circumvent the regulation or new, alternative avenues for enriching themselves. This Article uncovers one recent and...

How should one regulate a firm when its investment may cause a negative externality? In this paper we present a model on regulating a firm run by a manager and owned by a shareholder. The regulator can impose a penalty on the manager, the shareholder, or both. Our characterization of optimal...

The global financial crisis highlighted the interconnectedness of international financial markets and the risk of contagion it posed. The crisis also emphasized the importance of supranational regulation and regulatory cooperation to address that risk. Yet, although capital flows are global,...

We examine whether the market for ICOs can alleviate asymmetric information and incentive problems through self-imposed governance mechanisms despite the limited regulation in this market. We propose what we call the substitution hypothesis which states that market forces incentivize ICO issuers...