We analyze the formality benefits through productivity-enhancing public goods. We document that: benefits from formality matter for firms’ optimal decisions; there is a disconnect between the objectives of maximizing formality versus welfare; this disconnect is mitigated under higher formality...

This focus of this paper is the regulation of one segment of modern Islamic finance: Islamic banking, whether conducted by stand-alone Islamic banks or “Islamic windows” within conventional interest-based banks. Consideration is given to a select group of illustrative issues that arise in...

We investigate the post-listing experience of companies raising capital on the London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market (AIM). The AIM is unique in that it is privately regulated and relies on Nominated Advisors (Nomads) who compete to bring new listings and provide ongoing...

This paper's hypothesis is that the international standard setting bodies (SSBs) could improve the quality of their international standards by incorporating a human rights analysis. It focuses on five SSBs and seven of their international standards and its findings include the following: First,...

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent...

In this appendix, we provide the following for each of the 26 sample countries in Hail, Tahoun, and Wang (2018), Corporate Scandals and Regulation, Journal of Accounting Research 56(2): 617–671: a brief overview of the country's historical background and the major developments affecting the...

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent...

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre‐empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent...