After the destructive impact of the global financial crisis of 2008, many believe that pre-crisis financial market regulation did not take the "big picture" of the system suffciently into account and, subsequently, financial supervision mainly "missed the forest for the trees". As a result, the...

This study explores the effect of regulatory governance on financial stability using cross-sectional data from 55 countries. The findings show that regulatory governance and various subcomponents of regulatory governance are positively correlated with financial stability in the selected...

This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory...

To calculate regulatory capital ratios, banks have to apply adjustments to book equity. These adjustments vary with a bank's solvency position: Low solvency banks report values of Tier 1 regulatory capital that exceed book equity. These banks benefit from regulatory adjustments to inflate...

We evaluate the impact of mortgage regulation on credit volumes, household balance sheets and the reaction to adverse economic shocks. Using a comprehensive dataset of all housing transactions in Norway matched with buyers' balance sheet information from official tax records, we identify causal...

I show that political dominance of prudential regulation leads to inefficient corporate lending and distorts real outcomes for borrowing firms. Using the context of India where state-owned (public) banks compose around 70% of non-bank lending, I exploit a surprise regulation of nonperforming...

We study the efficiency of banking regulation under financial integration. Banks freely choose the jurisdiction where to locate their activities and have private information about their efficiency level. Regulators non-cooperatively offer any regulatory contract that satisfies information and...

Regulation of risks in banking is driven by evolution of financial intermediation and markets, and vice versa. The study analyzes a changing nature of financial institutions' regulatory and supervisory trends in emerging markets over last 20 years, providing outlook for the future. Although the...

We study the political economy of bank capital regulation from a positive and normative perspective. In a general equilibrium setting, capital requirements and lobbying contributions are determined as the outcome of bargaining between banks and politicians. We show that bankers and politicians...