Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a … third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a … because the revolving door publicly signals the firm's eagerness and commitment to rewarding lenient regulators, which …

Firms have incentives to influence regulators' decisions. In a dynamic setting, we show that a firm may prefer to … capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the revolving-door channel) than through a … reward friendly regulators, which facilitates collusive equilibria. Moreover, the revolvingdoor channel need not require an …

financing increases with freedom from corruption, rule of law, quality of regulations, and decreases with court disputes. We …

This paper analyzes the effects of the revolving door, focusing not only on the relationship between regulators and …, the revolving door enables government to hire regulators which are highly qualified individuals due to their prospect of a … high future compensation package. On the other hand, the revolving door enables regulators to be greedy, and receive …

Congress roll call votes on financial liberalisation were biased by industry-led campaign contributions and lobbying activities …

financing increases with freedom from corruption, rule of law, quality of regulations, and decreases with court disputes. We …

authorization and strict authorization. We find that corruption plays a critical role in the choice of the authorization regime …. Corruption exacerbates the costs of using lenient authorization, under which production of socially harmful goods is always … authorized. In contrast, corruption can be socially beneficial under strict authorization, since it can mitigate an over …