Our paper evaluates recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments and claw-back clauses in the financial sector. We study a broadly applicable principal agent setting, in which the agent exerts effort for an immediately observable task (acquisition) and a task for which...

This paper proposes an indirect tax approach to derive positive and normative implications of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements for bonus-pay typically lead to...

Embedding consumer experimentation with a product or service into a market environment, we find that unregulated contracts induce too few returns or cancellations, as they do not internalize a pecuniary externality on other firms in the market. Forcing firms to let consumers learn longer by...

This paper characterizes equilibrium persuasion through selective disclosure based on the personal information that senders acquire about the preferences and orientations of receivers, with applications to strategic marketing and campaigning. We derive positive and normative implications...