We assembled a large panel of project-level technical and financial data and country-level economic, institutional, political, and governance variables to assess the determinants of private financing of infrastructure in emerging markets and developing economies. Controlling for economic...

We assembled a large panel of project-level technical and financial data and country-level economic, institutional, political, and governance variables to assess the determinants of private financing of infrastructure in emerging markets and developing economies. Controlling for economic...

This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and infrastructure policy reforms.  I construct a simple model to illustrate how both an incerase in regulatory autonomy and privatisation may influence the effect of corruption.  This interaction is then analysed empirically using a...

This is a summarized and abridged version of some of the arguments made in the report “OpenTradeCloud: Regulating the Next Generation of the National Market System” [Summary Report], that is part of my doctorate research at Columbia Law School. It is still very rough and preliminary, and it...

This was the first article explicitly on the theory of agency published in a regular, i.e., nonproceedings, issue of a journal in social science.The paper presents a fiduciary function model of policing in agency, with an application to attempts to influence regulatory performance by policing...

The crafting of new international regulatory directives is often done within international organizations (IOs). This paper shows how a public choice framework can explain this trend. Models of bureaucracy are presented against which the conditions and incentives of international bureaucrats are...

There are many situations in which a principal delegates decisions to a better-informed agent but does not choose to give full discretion. This paper discusses one reason why this might be desirable: the agent may have tastes that differ from those of the principal. Limiting the agent's...

Ramsey-Boiteux prices and monopoly prices are frequently regarded as being similar. This might suggest that, in particular in network in- dustries with large fixed costs, sometimes monopoly pricing is close to the Ramsey-Boiteux second best and welfare superior to imperfectly regulated prices....

We survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of political economy. The first ones extend the theory of regulation with incomplete information to address privatization...