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The Business of American Democracy : Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections
Klumpp, Tilman - 2016
In Citizens United v. FEC (2010), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that restrictions on independent political expenditures by corporations and labor unions are unconstitutional. We analyze the effects of Citizens United on state election outcomes. We find that Citizens United is associated with an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007297
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Gains from early support of a new political party
Leonardi, Marco; Mossucca, Rossella; Schivardi, Fabiano; … - 2019
We study the potential benefits and mechanisms of firms' political connections by analyzing the Italian experience, where, in the early nineties, Silvio Berlusconi, a rich TV tycoon, became the leader of the conservative political coalition. Using firm-level data, we find that the 101 companies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012063531
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Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis : A Comment
Sunstein, Cass R. - 2014
Many regulators have concluded that cost-benefit analysis is the best available method for capturing the welfare effects of regulations. It is therefore understandable that in recent years, some people have been interested in requiring financial regulators to engage in careful cost-benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054943
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Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation : Case Studies and Implications
Coates, IV, John C. - 2015
-benefit analysis for financial regulation: judicially enforced quantification. How would CBA work in practice, if applied to specific …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033646
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Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation : Case Studies and Implications
Coates, IV, John C. - 2015
-benefit analysis for financial regulation: judicially enforced quantification. How would CBA work in practice, if applied to specific …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013034461
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The Dialectical Regulation of Rule 14a-8 : Intersystemic Governance in Corporate Law
Ahdieh, Robert B. - 2012
In recent years, Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act - first adopted more than sixty years ago to increase shareholder participation in corporate governance - has been the subject of a flurry of litigation, scholarly analysis, and SEC rulemaking. Most recently, following several years of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218786
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Regulatory Regimes and Employer Organization : The Analysis of Postcommunist Business-State Relations
Duvanova, Dinissa - 2010
The interest group theories that link regulations and activities of special interest groups, predict higher levels of collective action to coincide with more extensive regulations. The fact that economic regulations and enforcement mechanisms may impose the costs on interest organization and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013140628
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Interests, Bias, and Consensus in Science and Regulation
Socol, Yehoshua - 2020
Scientists are human. As such, they are prone to bias based on political and economic interests. While conflicts of interest are usually associated with private funding, research funded by public sources is also subject to special interests and therefore prone to bias. Such bias may lead to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834243
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Regulation, the Market, and Interest Group Cohesion : Why Airlines Were Not Reregulated
Levine, Michael E. - 2007
incidence violates traditional versions of the economic theory of regulation. Organized subgroups should be able to protect … principal reasons, one requiring a refinement of the theory. The first is that under regulation the incentives of both … creation and wealth transfer through regulation requires both political unity and quot;slackquot;, that is, protection from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778192
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Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State
Charap, Joshua - 2006
This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012782606