Narrow search
Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Cover Image
Organizational capacity, regulatory review, and the limits of political control
Bolton, Alexander; Potter, Rachel Augustine; Thrower, … - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 32 (2016) 2, pp. 242-271
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011641808
Cover Image
When do firms hire lobbyists? : the organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
Figueiredo, John M. de; Kim, James J. - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002113558
Cover Image
When do firms hire lobbyists? : The organization of lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
Figueiredo, John M. de; Kim, James J. - In: Industrial and corporate change 13 (2004) 6, pp. 883-900
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002472777
Cover Image
Democratic rulemaking
Figueiredo, John M. de; Stiglitz, Edward H. - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011427998
Cover Image
When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
de Figueiredo, John M. - 2004
This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468140
Cover Image
When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
de Figueiredo, John M.; Kim, James J. - 2014
This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029424
Cover Image
When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
de Figueiredo, John M.; Kim, James J. - 2021
This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013230204