This paper evaluates the effects of binding regulatory restraints on the rate of performance-based management compensation within a banking framework in which the primary function of bank management teams is to monitor loans in order to eliminate deadweight default losses. Available management...

This paper presents a dynamic model of a bank's optimal choices of imposing a binding liquidity-coverage-ratio (LCR) constraint. Our baseline balance-sheet dynamics starts with portfolio separation and no LCR constraint. Under a scenario in which regulators prohibit banks from applying...

We propose a theory of 'regulatory endogenous sunk costs' (RESC), in which a captured regulator raises minimum quality standards when market size increases in order to protect incumbent firms. Our RESC theory's predictions that market size is unrelated to industry concentration and positively...

This book provides an evaluation of the industrial organization of banking with a focus on the interrelationship among bank behavior, market structure, and regulation. It addresses a wide range of public policy topics, including bank competition and risk, international banking, antitrust issues,...