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agencies. After having examined the market, competition authorities concluded that tacit collusion existed but could not easily … type of variable tax scheme successfully manages to render collusion an unprofitable business. In addition, it is also easy … - and therefore non-prosecutable - collusion, could be turned into a regulatory virtue as it becomes a powerful means to …
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agencies. After having examined the market, competition authorities concluded that tacit collusion existed but could not easily … specially tailored tax on price successfully manages to render collusion an unprofitable business by collecting marginal profits … and that the inherent vice of the gasoline retail market, i.e., the transparency that enables tacit-and therefore non-prosecutable-collusion …
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setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the regulator and the firm, which results in the manipulation of the … regulator's report on the firm's costs to Congress. The firm's bene.t of collusion arises from the higher price the efficient … collusion only if the regulator's bargaining power in the regulatory relationship is relatively high. Then, we derive the …
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Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491609
Firms have incentives to influence regulators' decisions. In a dynamic setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the revolving-door channel) than through a hidden payment (i.e., a bribe). This is because the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012220065