Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the...

Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the...

Two key assumptions underlying the regulation of U.S. financial reporting are the need to mandate the certification of financial statements, and to require that this certification be performed by independent auditors. Private incentives to demand (and supply) certification are thought to be...

Starting from January 2017, all publicly listed firms in the United States are required to disclose a pay ratio of annual CEO compensation to the median employee compensation (Pay Ratio). Opponents of this legislation have argued that this additional Pay Ratio disclosure would simply add to the...

This paper examines the effect of disclosure regulation on the takeover market. We study the implementation of a recent European regulation that imposes tighter disclosure requirements regarding the financial and ownership information on public firms. We find a substantial drop in the number of...

This paper studies the consequences of regulating executive compensation at financial institutions by examining the introduction of the UK Remuneration Code, which aimed to change the decision-making horizon and risk-taking incentives of bank executives. We find that, in line with the intent of...

This paper describes how behavioral elements are relevant to financial supervision,regulation, and central banking. It focuses on (1) behavioral effects of norms (social, legal,and market); (2) behavior of others (internalization, identification, and compliance); and(3) psychological biases. It...

Boards of directors have been subject to unprecedented pressure to change and professionalize in the last decades. We analyze board structures of blue-chip firms in Switzerland between 1988 and 2017. The study shows that exogenous sources, not particularly induced by hard law, have had an...

This study identifies one potential benefit of mandatory investor protection laws in weak investor protection countries neglected by the extant literature: laws help reduce firms' bonding costs to strong corporate governance. We argue that corporate insiders (outside investors) have little...

From October 2013, UK law and regulations (the Reform) require periodic binding shareholders' approval of executive directors' remuneration policy, as well as enhanced disclosure in remuneration reports. These requirements supplement an ongoing requirement for an annual non-binding vote on...