We provide evidence suggesting that corporate credit rating changes have an effect on firms' voluntary disclosure behavior that is independent of the information they convey about firm fundamentals. Our analyses exploit two separate quasi-experimental settings that generate either exogenous...

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent...

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre‐empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent...

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent...

In this appendix, we provide the following for each of the 26 sample countries in Hail, Tahoun, and Wang (2018), Corporate Scandals and Regulation, Journal of Accounting Research 56(2): 617–671: a brief overview of the country's historical background and the major developments affecting the...