We propose and find that enhanced regulatory transparency facilitates alignment between private and public enforcement. Utilizing the SEC's 2004 decision to publicly disclose its comment letters, we explore the actions of a public enforcer (the SEC) and a private enforcer (shareholder...

Regulators of over-the-counter (OTC) markets face a unique enforcement challenge. OTC markets are particularly susceptible to investor fraud, but prior research indicates regulators prefer to focus their enforcement efforts on larger, exchange-listed firms. We shed light on the SEC’s tailored...

Regulatory economics suggests that one benefit of public enforcement is the deterrence of improper conduct. Using a difference-in-differences design, we investigate whether a deterrence effect follows the revelation of PCAOB enforcement. We find that large audit firm offices improve audit...

To protect investors, regulators increasingly rely on regulating firms' internal controls over financial reporting, but they punish noncompliance only if an internal control weakness enabled accounting manipulation. In other words, enforcement is manipulation-contingent. We develop an economic...

This article discusses a trend towards increased empiricism in enforcement reporting by financial regulators that emphasises greater use of numerical indicators. The article examines how the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the...

Within the past decade, the EU has made significant steps in strengthening and harmonising the legal framework of capital markets. Despite passing and amending secondary legislation on this topic, it only partially addressed the issue of enforcement, leaving private enforcement an issue for its...

We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new...

We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new...

While Regulation FD was designed to benefit investors by curbing the selective disclosure of material non-public information to “covered” investors, such as analysts and institutional investors, it can also impose costs. This paper finds that FD levies three kinds of enforcement and...

This paper analyzes the impact of FD enforcement by calculating (1) the aggregate market gain to covered investors from access to selective information during the FD violation period and (2) the market response to the SEC enforcement announcement, at which time public investors first learn of an...