Ein Jahr nach Inkrafttreten der deutschen Energierechtsnovelle sind die Konturen der zukünftigen Strommarktregulierung noch zu weiten Teilen ungeklärt. Vor diesem aktuellen wirtschaftspolitischem Hintergrund wird in diesem Papier die Frage nach einer sachgerechten Ausrichtung der...

Despite all of the talk about "deregulation" of the electricity sector, a large number of non-market mechanisms have been imposed on emerging competitive wholesale and retail markets. These mechanisms include spot market price caps, operating reserve requirements, non-price rationing protocols,...

In diesem Papier werden die in Kumkar (1999) gewonnene Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich der komparativen Vorteile alternativer Liberalisierungsmodell für die Stromwirtschaft auf die deutsche Situation übertragen. Ziel ist die Erarbeitung von Empfehlungen für die weitere wettbewerbliche Neuordnung...

There can be no doubt that the FANG companies – Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google, as well as Twitter – have transformed society since their emergence. Like all social transformations, the changes wrought by their services have had ripple effects that are both positive and negative. On...

Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google, as well as Twitter – the FANG companies – have transformed society with both positive and negative effects. Soaring consumer access to information, news, social networks, and entertainment has been stimulated by the ever-more ubiquitous and falling...

Im Mittelpunkt dieses Beitrags steht eine Analyse des kalifornischen Strommarktdebakels und der Lehren aus den dortigen Ereignissen. Das Papier geht auf die Entwicklung der Märkte ein und zeigt die Gründe für das Scheitern des kalifornischen Übergangsmodells auf. Die Analyse zeigt, dass es...

We argue that information asymmetries between regulators and firms increase the administrative decision costs of initiating new policies due to the costs of satisfying evidentiary or “burden of proof” requirements. We further contend that regulators with better information about regulated...

The traditionally large and sunk nature of utility investments gives rise to the possibility, if not the likelihood, of opportunistic behavior on the part of either regulators or regulated firms. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model to provide insights into this possibility, then employ...

Jarrell (1978) found that electricity prices rose in states that adopted state regulation before 1917, suggesting that regulators were "captured" by the interests of the regulated electric utilities. An alternative explanation is that state regulation more credibly protected specialized utility...