This study identifies one potential benefit of mandatory investor protection laws in weak investor protection countries neglected by the extant literature: laws help reduce firms' bonding costs to strong corporate governance. We argue that corporate insiders (outside investors) have little...

I examine whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US is a learning organization (i.e., one that is capable of learning and adaptation to the dynamic nature of the securities markets – the subject of the SEC's regulatory oversight). Using the treatment of public corporate...

This paper proposes a theoretical model that incorporates corporate governance into the basic CAPM, where corporate governance affects the disutility of managerial effort and the possibility of managers to divert company resources. It shows that corporate governance affects firms’ stock...

This paper analyzes the economic rationale for board regulation in place and for introducing new regulation in the future. We relate the value of the firm to the use of employee directors, board independence, directors with multiple seats, and to gender diversity. Our evidence shows that the...

Much has been said about the convergence of corporate governance and regulations. The underlying assumptions of this phenomenon are driven by globalisation and the dominance of the Anglo-US model of corporate governance. Since the Asian crisis in 1997, Hong Kong and perhaps to a less extend...

From the start of China's "corporatization without privatization" process in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime apparently shareholder-empowering and determined by enabling legal norms has been altered by mandatory governance mechanisms imposed by a state administrative...

The issue of appropriate corporate governance framework has been a focal point of recent reforms in many countries. This study provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of corporate governance regulatory systems and their evolution over the last 15 years in 30 European countries and the US....

We study the governance choices of firms in a voluntary regulatory regime where we can directly observe the impact of ownership on corporate governance practices pertaining to the composition of the board of directors. We find that firms with a dominant shareholder are more likely to deviate...

This paper examines minority squeeze-outs and their regulation in Germany, a country where majority shareholders have extensively used this tool since its introduction in 2002. Using unique data on court rulings and compensations, we analyze a sample of 324 squeeze-outs of publicly listed...

I show that private equity transactions (i) illustrate market-driven reactions to inefficient equity markets that result from the diffusion of equity ownership in the public firm and (ii) form part of a larger market trend to-wards the market oriented blockholder model – a hybrid ownership...