The informationally simple approach to incentive regulation applies mechanisms that translate the regulator's objective function into the firm's profit-maximizing objective. These mechanisms come in two forms, one based on subsidies/taxes, the other based on constraints/price caps. In spite of a...

To date, the distributive implications of incentive regulation on electricity transmission networks have not been explicitly studied in the literature. More specifically, the parameters that a regulator might use to achieve distributive efficiency under price-cap regulation have not yet been...

The Comision Reguladora de Energia of Mexico has implemented a netback rule for linking the Mexican natural gas price to the Texas natural gas benchmark price in an industry structure characterized by a vertically integrated state-owned monopoly. This paper shows that in an open economy where...

We study the performance of different regulatory approaches for the expansion of electricity transmission networks in the light of realistic demand patterns and fluctuating wind power. In particular, we are interested in the relative performance of a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism...

We propose a merchant-regulatory framework to promote investment in the European natural gas network infrastructure based on a price cap over two-part tariffs. As suggested by Vogelsang (2001) and Hogan et al. (2010), a profit maximizing network operator facing this regulatory constraint will...

We analyze the current regulatory regime for electricity transmission in Germany, which combines network planning with both cost-plus and revenue-cap regulations. After reviewing international experiences on transmission investment, we first make a qualitative assessment of the overall German...