In a companion note (Antitrust vs. Sector-specific Regulation in Telecom: What Works Best?), we argued that while the full liberalization of telecommunications markets provides scope for relying to a large extent on general antitrust rules and institutions as instruments of economic regulation,...

Article 82 of EC Treaty prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position; the examples contained of “abuse” reflect a variety of public policies that have led European antitrust authorities in several directions simultaneously, indicating also a highly regulatory policy...

The price-squeeze doctrine, and the discussion of up to what extent can a dominant firm discipline its rivals by means of pricing policies has lead to a wide divergence of antitrust enforcement and consequent liability rules across the Atlantic, and even between US' agencies – the Department...

We consider a profit-maximizing monopolist that faces N2 different markets while the number k of discriminatory prices is chosen by the regulator. Unlike the classical approach in which only the polar cases are considered, we explicitly analyze the case in which k is an integer between 1 and N....

This paper proposes a model of the ridesourcing market in presence of traffic congestion and with the provision of both solo and pooling services. Our analysis of the first-best solution shows that, under a highly congested scenario, the ridesourcing platform may enjoy non-negative profits....

A recent proposal for net neutrality regulation in the wireless industry suggests carriers should open their networks in particular ways. The proposal advocates creating standards that will make it easier for developers to write applications and for hardware firms to create devices that will...

This Article challenges the various jurisdictional theories that underpin the FCC’s net neutrality regulation. The assertion of jurisdiction by the FCC over any aspect of the Internet ecosystem has raised populist, congressional, and even judicial rhetoric to a crescendo and resulted in a...

This paper shows how scale economies affect welfare-maximizing regulation and regulated firms' investment behavior. Price-regulated firms take less advantage of scale economies than social planners, with greater investment distortions for greater economies of scale. Price caps should be below...

Regulated firms are exposed to asset-stranding risk whenever allowed revenue depends on past capital expenditure: if demand falls far enough, past expenditure is unrecoverable. I show that such regulation induces firms to invest in more capital, but distorts the trade-off between investment...

We discuss the benefits of net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model in which platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content and applications providers on the other side of the Internet. When access is monopolized, we find that...