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We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium … the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459
.e. a contest against other rent-seekers). At the aggregate level, rent-seeking reduces the available amount of labor in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012652831
advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138834
advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intradivisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012134718
disadvantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to freeride is larger in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is fiercer. Both effects lower the marginal utility of effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236504
advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter …-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intradivisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013341970
that increases wealth or through a contest in which unproductive (rent-seeking) effort is used to redistribute wealth …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014456231
We consider a variant of the Tullock lottery contest. Each player's constant marginal cost of effort is drawn from a … dissipation, however, is higher than in the latter settings if we focus on the standard lottery contest and assume costs are all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070148
This paper proposes a tractable model of a dynamic contest where players have private information about the contest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012318681
We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) where some players know the value of the prize, others do not. We show that if the prize is always of positive value, then all players are active in equilibrium. If the prize is of value zero with positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055053