Rent seeking contest shapes the risk preference of the contestants. It instills in the weaker contestant who has little to lose and much to gain a preference for risk taking, and the weaker the contestant, the stronger the instilled preference for risk taking. On the other hand, it causes the...

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and...

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and...

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts, and...

This paper uses a formal model to analyze the effects of rent seeking contest on production when the contestants are both rent seekers and producers and production output is an input of rent seeking effort. Great economies of scale in rent seeking and an even distribution of rent seeking...

This paper analyzes an infinitely repeated game of contest for resources. It studies how rent seeking technology affects the long term sustainability of pluralistic competition where there is more than one contestant to resources. If there is over dissipation of rent, pluralistic competition is...

The present paper analyzes situations in which groups compete for rents. A major result in the literature has been that there are both cases where larger groups have advantages and cases where they have disadvantages. The paper provides two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous...

The present paper analyzes the occurrence of the group-size paradox in situations in which groups compete for rents, allowing for degrees of rivalness of the rent among group members. We provide two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous valuations of the rent determine whether...

This paper seeks to expand on two topical strands in Government Finance and Political Science literature, rent-seeking and the soft-budget constraint, so as to bring forth a strong linkage with corporate governance environments. It will attempt to accomplish this task by setting up a distinctive...