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Infinitely repeated games with discounting : a general theory
Abreu, Dilip - 1984
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001809414
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An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Abreu, Dilip; Sannikov, Yuliy - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 313-338
Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599513
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Renegotiation and summetry in repeated games
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David W.; Stacchetti, Ennio - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000768970
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The folk theorem for discounted repeated games : a new condition
Abreu, Dilip; Dutta, Prajit K. - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000825940
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The folk theorem for discounted repeated games : a new condition
Abreu, Dilip; Dutta, Prajit K. - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000826499
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Information and timing in repeated partnerships
Abreu, Dilip; Milgrom, Paul; Pearce, David W. - 1988
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000758701
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Bargaining, reputation and equilibrium selection in repeated games with contracts
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 75 (2007) 3, pp. 653-710
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003473302
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An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Abreu, Dilip; Sannikov, Yuliy - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 313-338
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010386079
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Information and timing in repeated partnerships
Abreu, Dilip; Milgrom, Paul; Pearce, David W. - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000789170
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An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Abreu, Dilip; Sannikov, Yuliy - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 313-338
Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674609