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Forges, Françoise - 2014

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418

Bayesian repeated games and reputations

Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693

Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - 2005

definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be … completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312355

Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090

Beyond fictitious play beliefs: Incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 69-85

Belief models capable of detecting 2- to 5-period patterns in repeated games by matching the current historical context to similar realizations of past play are presented. The models are implemented in a cognitive framework, ACT-R, and vary in how they implement similarity-based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049875

Humans versus computer algorithms in repeated mixed strategy games

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

estimated EWA learning models which suﬀered from overﬁtting. Subjects modiﬁed their strategies in the direction of better … response as calculated from CA simulations of various learning models, albeit not perfectly. Examples include the observation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789888

Once beaten, never again : imitation in two-player potential games

Dürsch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2012

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569667

Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2015

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516648

Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2017

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011764914

Alternating or compensating? : an experiment on the repeated sequential best shot game

Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Güth, Werner - 2013

In the two-person sequential best shot game, first player 1 contributes to a public good and then player 2 is informed about this choice before contributing. The payoff from the public good is the same for both players and depends only on the maximal contribution. Efficient voluntary cooperation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010252393