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Bayesian repeated games and reputations
Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputation
Forges, Francoise - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418
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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - 2005
definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be … completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312355
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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be … completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
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Once beaten, never again : imitation in two-player potential games
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - 2012
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569667
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Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games
Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2012
We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097801
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Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games
Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2017
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971885
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Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games - Second Version
Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2017
We investigate whether two players in a long-run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown. Specifically, we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring, where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974183
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Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games
Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2010
We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games with incomplete information where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions and the map from actions to signal distributions is itself unknown. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189386
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Beyond fictitious play beliefs: Incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching
Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 69-85
Belief models capable of detecting 2- to 5-period patterns in repeated games by matching the current historical context to similar realizations of past play are presented. The models are implemented in a cognitive framework, ACT-R, and vary in how they implement similarity-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049875