remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …

remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …

equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …

Credit-rating agencies have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility among investors but also have … an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency among issuers. We show that in markets with few issuers … form a “double reputation.” The model extends the existing literature on “cheap-talk” reputation to the case of two …

the equilibrium payoff of the long-lived player (demonstrating ex ante reputation effects) and to show that this lower … bound is asymptotically irrelevant under imperfect monitoring (demonstrating the impermanence of reputation effects). The … chapter continues by examining the (necessarily weaker) reputation results that can be established for the case of two long …