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We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852
remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126752
remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076291
Community enforcement is an important device for sustaining efficiency in some repeated games of cooperation. We investigate cooperation when information about players' reputations spreads to their future partners through links in a social network that connects them. We find that information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773641
equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795331
We study impersonal exchange, and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158850
Credit-rating agencies have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility among investors but also have … an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency among issuers. We show that in markets with few issuers … form a “double reputation.” The model extends the existing literature on “cheap-talk” reputation to the case of two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036167
the equilibrium payoff of the long-lived player (demonstrating ex ante reputation effects) and to show that this lower … bound is asymptotically irrelevant under imperfect monitoring (demonstrating the impermanence of reputation effects). The … chapter continues by examining the (necessarily weaker) reputation results that can be established for the case of two long …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025455