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This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301144
The influence of local politics is often dismissed in parliamentary systems. Parliamentary democracies are characterized by the double monopoly of power and high degrees of party cohesion are observed as Members of Parliament (MPs) face strong incentives to vote along party lines. Dissenting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063138
a better reputation as supporters of the reform. At a more general level, the argument applies to situations where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069590
I consider the strategies that an opposition party can use against an incumbent party which controls the government. The focus is on strategies when citizens vote retrospectively (so that the incumbent's chance of winning re-election increases with his performance), and when citizens compare the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970926
Information affecting a candidate's reputation might have significant electoral consequences. Do candidates respond to … the release of information? Using Brazilian elections and audits as an exogenous source of information, I show that both … incumbent and challenger increase their campaign spending when detrimental information affects the incumbent's reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012545128
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200630
We suggest a model of electoral competition between two parties which is extended by a third player : mass media. The classical one-dimensional competition model is changed by introducing an issue-specific sensibility-coefficient and by allowing for non-voting. The winner is selected by majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441433
When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325563
investigate how reputation concerns among governors influence the decision to experiment with welfare policies. In line with a … political agency model, our empirical results suggest that governors with high reputation among the electorate are less likely … to experiment with welfare policies than governors with low reputation. Yet, governors with high reputation who are less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283135
When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334827