We interpret the psychology literature on social identity and examine its implications in a population partially … matched to play a reduced form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the … behavioral player is motivated by the social identity literature. For rational players, group membership has no payoff relevant …

We interpret the social identity literature and examine its economic implications. We model a population of agents from … that this struggle for resources drives a conflict through the rational destruction of surplus. We assume that the … social group. The existence and specification of the biased player is motivated by the social identity literature. For …

literature. In the present contribution a game-theoretic model highlights how reputation concerns and the structure of group …

reputation and ethnic conflict is built. Depending on the information structure and the reputation cost of defecting, economic … interaction can either result in (peaceful) trade or in appropriative conflict. Ethnic divisions affect the reputation cost of …Empirical studies have found ethnic cleavages to play an important role in the occurrence of civil conflict …

This paper considers a simple model of zero-sum conflict between two players (e.g., territorial dispute) in which … costly actions (e.g., terrorism) are available to one side. We identify how reputation effects shape the outcome of such … conflict. A small prior of fanatic commitment type induces the possibility of costly attack followed by withdrawal in …

Throughout history, victory in conflict has created fearsome reputations. With it, the victor ensures greater … motives for conflict. When only victory or defeat is informative, the less scary party may attack to show that they are … tougher than expected. If the occurrence of conflict also conveys information, the scarier party is more likely to attack. By …

observe surprisingly high levels of within - group cooperation in conflict situations such as civil wars. We provide an … future security. We argue that a group's reputation is a public good with a natural weakest - link structure. We extend the …

these reputation concerns is amplified when the communication within the boardroom is transparent …

its equilibrium strategy in a repeated but finite game, in order to build an environmental reputation if we suppose that … reputation. Due to the peculiarity of environmental information (green products are credence goods), we claim that an explicit … the reputation effect. …