This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have … natural monopoly. 3) Price competition tends to a monopolization. The results derive from a general principle of reputation … efficient market institutions that sell reputation as a service to other firms. …

monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a higher accuracy attracts high-quality sellers but … one certifier, competition plays a disciplining role and the region where reputation is bad shrinks. Conversely, this …

show that in contrast with projects implemented by a single firm, in the case of joint projects a firm's reputation does … reputation considerations affect firms' decisions to participate in joint projects. We show that a high quality partner may not … be preferable to a low quality partner, and that a high reputation partner is not necessarily preferable to a low …

Reputation systems are emerging as an increasingly important component of online communities, helping elicit good …-depth study of the motivations of trader participation in eBay's reputation system. To examine these questions, we analyze data … expectation of reciprocal behavior from partners increases reputation system participation from self-interested eBay buyers and …

This paper offers a systematic exploration of reputation mechanism design in trading environments with opportunistic …. The objective of reputation mechanisms in such settings is to induce sellers to exert high effort as often as possible. I … reputation profile, the policy regarding missing feedback, and the rules for admitting new sellers) on the resulting market …

over seller quality. Typically, these markets use reputation systems to alleviate this issue, but the effectiveness of … auction, or wait for more bids. In the process, she trades-off sellers’ price, reputation, other attributes, and the costs of … waiting and canceling. Our framework addresses ‘dynamic selection’, which can lead to underestimation of reputation, through …

is a noisy indicator of the firm's investment. We focus on dynamic reputation equilibria, whereby consumers "discipline …

Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable? We consider a competitive market in …-value customers. Hence reputation is a tradable intangible asset, although ownership change is observable. …