efficiency through dynamic collusion. In the theoretical part we establish a fundamental asymmetry: it is easier to avoid …-cooperative solution have been achieved. -- Multilateral bargaining ; hold-up ; irreversible investment ; collusion …

, 261-281) and Malawski (2002, Int J Game Theory 31:47-67). In particular, we show that the collusion properties employed by … them are equivalent. Combined with the dummy player axiom, any of the collusion properties has strong symmetry implications …-redundantly characterized by the dummy player axiom and any of the collusion properties, provided that the player set is as above. -- Banzhaf …

use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …

are indicative of collusion and allow the distinction between collusion from competition. This paper focuses on the … are worthy of more intense investigation. Thus the paper discusses the interrelationship between collusion/competition and …

This paper generalizes the classical duopoly collusion model by first deriving a new marginal cost curve. It then … have higher incentive to collude. It also distinguishes free collusion from centralized collusion, competition from …

The collusion incentive constraint is an important economic measure of cartel stability. It weighs the profits of being …

use efficiency which is not satisfied by the Banzhaf value. On the other hand, the Banzhaf value satisfies collusion …, collusion neutrality and the null player property. Finally, we show that a solution satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality …

-responsive demand demonstrates that demand response programs discourage collusion. The presence of price-responsive demand decreases the …