We investigate asymmetric price transmission (APT) in laboratory experiments and find that imperfect tacit collusion is …

equilibrium) in a differentiated duopoly with process innovation. One of the important features in this paper is that spillovers … four separate organization setups (Full Competition, Semi-collusion in Production, Semi-collusion in R&D and Full Collusion …). It is found that under technological proximity, competitions at the upstream stage depress R&D investment, and firms …

increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal solution as … initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion …

the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for …. Product market collusion could thus yield higher total surplus …

the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for …. Product market collusion could thus yield higher total surplus. …

increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal solution as … initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion …

This paper studies the effect of forward contracts on the stability of collusion among firms, competing in supply … functions on the spot market. A forward market can increase the range of discount factors which allow to sustain collusion. On … the contrary, collusion is destabilised when a potential deviator sells a significant amount forward. Results do not …

Theoretical literature on collusion has focused on a specific formulation of payoff fluctuations, namely by demand … shocks, and showed that payoff fluctuations are bad for collusion. Introducing general payoff fluctuations, we show that (i …) payoff fluctuations may strictly reduce the minimum discount factor to sustain collusion and (ii) both mutual cooperation and …