We analyze health care option demand markets with vertical restraints divided along two dimensions: naked and conditional exclusion, and vertical integration; applicable to the upstream, the downstream, and both markets. Our unified framework includes forward and backward integration, and joint...

This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts in the presence of complementary inputs. A downstream firm transforms multiple complementary inputs into final products. When complementary input suppliers have market power, upstream competition within a given input market...

This paper (only available in Spanish) summarises the relevant literature in the field of vertical restraints in connection with retail markets and distribution, and provides some insights from Chilean practice

This paper explores the concept of vertical restraints or restrictions. It includes references to the competition law regimes of the European Union (EU), United States (US), and the People's Republic of China, as well as the key case law. It is part of the Concurrences' Global Dictionary of...

In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork discusses policy responses to naked and ancillary price fixing as well as vertical restraints. Empirical research finds that vertical restraints are generally welfare-enhancing. We examine cartels that used vertical restraints to support collusion. We find...

The EU competition policy in regard to vertical restraints is mainly based upon neoclassical efficiencyoriented reasonings, leading to a neglect of the innovation dimension. This article analyses to what extent evolutionary theories of competition and innovation economics can be used to derive...

This paper presents an overview of what economists can say about vertical constraints by multi-sided platforms at this stage in the development of our knowledge about the economics of these businesses. It describes the general procompetitive and anticompetitive uses of vertical restraints by...

This article discusses the approaches of the European Union (EU) and of the United States (US) to the notions of agreement and concerted practice applied to horizontal collusive consequences of vertical restraints. I conclude that networks of vertical restraints blur the differences between...

This chapter analyzes the private rationale and the social costs and benefits of market foreclosure, here defined as a firm's restriction of output in one market through the use of market power in another market. The chapter first focuses on vertical foreclosure (in which full access to a...