We analyse the all-pay auction with incomplete information and variance-averse bidders. We characterise the unique symmetric equilibrium for general distributions of valuations and any number of bidders. Variance aversion is a sufficient assumption to predict that high-valuation bidders increase...

This study explores risk perceptions in social settings. Part of building business relationships involves informal activities outside of the firm where individuals can spend some time getting to know each other with the purpose of building better relationships. This study examines the social...

Suppose that a group of agents having divergent expectations can share risks efficiently. We examine how this group should behave collectively to manage these risks. We show that the beliefs of the representative agent is in general a function of the group.s wealth level, or equivalently, that...

In a risky world, should governments provide public goods that reduce risk or compensate the victims of bad outcomes? We examine the allocation of public expenditures in the context of a risky environment between the provision of a public good with risk-reducing characteristics, and the...

A link between social insurance and education policy is explored. Due to moral hazard full insurance against disability is not feasible. When high- and low-risk individuals can be identified, second-best social insurance system entails cross-subsidies from the low-risk group to the high-risk...

A ranking over a set of alternatives is an aggregation of experts' opinions (AEO) if it depends on the experts' assessments only. We study both those rankings that result from pooling Bayesian experts and those that result from pooling possibly non-Bayesian experts. In the non-Bayesian case, we...

In this paper I develop a model of a debt and equity financed representative firm whose production/investment decisions and financing decisions characterize business cycles. The conflict of interest problem between the differentially risk averse debt and equity investors is resolved with an...

This paper describes a parsimonious macro-finance model where contracts are the mechanism by which differentially risk averse bondholders and stockholders resolve a conflict of interest problem and confront the risks associated with future investment and financing decisions of a representative...

In this paper I develop a model that focuses attention on the financial side of business cycles. Investors in this model separate into bondholders and stockholders based on differences in risk aversion that creates a conflict of interest problem for the future management of the representative...

This paper describes a business cycle model where financial contracting with interrelated covenants is the mechanism by which bondholders and stockholders confront the risks associated with future production-investment decisions and financing decisions of the firm and in the process resolves a...