This paper proposes a pure-exchange economy with three key ingredients: habit formation, stochastic moments of aggregate consumption, and a small degree of heterogeneity in risk aversion consistent with empirical data. We obtain closed formulas for many equilibrium quantities, including the...

This paper studies the implications of arbitrage in a large asset market under conditions of (Knightian) uncertainty.First, I adapt the notion of arbitrage to a market in which the assets' returns are affected by uncertainty across probability distributions. The setting delivers the analog of...

Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run under the best-response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size the evolutionary process can select...

We run a laboratory experiment with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes in this game...

I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...

I analyze a monopolistic model of quality uncertainty but with the possibility of information acquisition on the consumer side. Information is costly and its amount is chosen by the consumer. The analysis of Bayesian equilibria shows the possibility of three equilibrium classes, only one of...

We consider a society with informed individuals (adults) and naive individuals (children). Adults are altruistic towards their own children and possess information that allows to better predict the behavior of other adults. Children benefit from adopting behaviors that conform to the social norm...

In a regime change game, agents sequentially decide whether to attack or not, without observing the past actions by others. To dissuade them from attacking, a principal adopts a dynamic information disclosure policy - repeated viability tests. A viability test publicly discloses whether the...

We study the design of public information structures that maximize the probability of selecting a Pareto dominant equilibrium in symmetric (2 x 2) coordination games. Because the need to coordinate exposes players to strategic risk, we treat the designer as able to implement an equilibrium only...

This paper studies a sequential learning problem where individuals are ambiguous about other people's signal structures. It finds that ambiguity has an important impact on social learning and provides new insights on the mechanism behind herding behavior. This paper claims that whether an...