Starting from Schelling (1960), several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal-form games with multiple equilibria - the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike...

This paper examines the distributional impact of increases to out-of-work transfers, increases to work-contingent transfers, and increases in higher rates of income tax over the whole of life. We find that, in contrast to what is implied by standard snapshot analyses, increases to...

Threshold common pool resource dilemmas, such as fisheries or groundwater reserves, are important topic for policy-makers. Uncertainty about the threshold for sustainable use or number of resource users may exacerbate the overconsumption problem. We are first to investigate the joint impact of...

This paper investigates experimentally whether risk attitudes are stable across social contexts. In particular, it focuses on situations where some resource (for instance, a position, decision power, a bonus) has to be allocated between two parties: the decision maker can either opt for sharing...

We present a theoretical framework to study risk and other-regarding preferences. The model can explain the main behavioral patterns in the combined domain and is the first to disentangle elementary attitudes on risk, altruism, social substitution, ex-ante inequality, and ex-post inequality. We...

From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are)...