This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights, contracts, or licenses that involve ensuing payoff uncertainty for the winning bidder. The distribution of the random payoff is common knowledge, except that bidders have private...

This paper presents a simulative model of a financial market, based on a fully operating order book with limit and market orders. The heterogeneity of traders is characterized not only with regards to their trading rules, but also by introducing a behavioral individual risk aversion and a...

We investigate the possibility of enhancing efficiency by awarding premiums to a set of highest bidders in an English auction - in a setting that extends Maskin and Riley (1984, Econometrica 52: 1473-1518) in three aspects: (i) the seller can be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have...

I study the emergence of coordination using a simple stag hunt game at both the individual and population levels. Consistent with the conjecture that coordination is difficult to attain in the n-player game, agents play risk dominant strategy when the number of matching partners increases....