This paper theoretically assesses the role that uncertainty plays in the intensity of conflicts. The standard two-player rent-seeking contest model (Tullock, 1980) is extended to allow for privately known subjective values of the prize. The conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each...

We study the design of public information structures that maximize the probability of selecting a Pareto dominant equilibrium in symmetric (2 x 2) coordination games. Because the need to coordinate exposes players to strategic risk, we treat the designer as able to implement an equilibrium only...

We consider the problem of valuing inputs in a production environment in which input supply is uncertain. Inputs can be workers in a firm, risk factors for a disease, securities in a financial market, or nodes in a networked economy. Each input takes its values from a finite set, and uncertainty...

Random choice as the outcome of deliberate randomization has been extensively documented in the recent experimental economics literature.Motivated by this evidence, we consider a decision-maker (DM) who faces a set of risky actions and can delegate his choice to a randomization device. We assume...

For a fixed game and a type structure that admits a common prior, Action Independence states that the conditional beliefs induced by the common prior do not depend on the player's own strategy. It has been conjectured that Action Independence can be behaviorally characterized by means of a...

We consider a society with informed individuals (adults) and naive individuals (children). Adults are altruistic towards their own children and possess information that allows to better predict the behavior of other adults. Children benefit from adopting behaviors that conform to the social norm...

This paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) under uncertainty, focusing on the role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success of IEA formation when countries are risk neutral and...

The willingness to trust human receivers is compared to the inclination to take lottery risk in six distinct scenarios, controlling the return distributions. Trust shows significantly smaller responsiveness to return expectations compared to parallel pure-risk lottery allocation, and paired...

This paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) under uncertainty, focusing on the role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success of IEA formation when countries are risk neutral and...