This paper studies technology adoption in a duopoly where the unbiased technological change improves production efficiency. Technological progress is exogenous and modeled as a jump process with a drift. There is always a Markov perfect equilibrium in which the firm with more efficient...

This article analyses management of hydropower dams within monopolistic and oligopolistic competition and when hydroelectricity producers are risk averse and face demand uncertainty. In each type of market structure we analytically determine the water release path in closed-loop equilibrium. We...

The significant excess of the price of risk, research question in the version paper, [S. Chule, in Applied Mathematical Finance, submitted June 2016], is space-domain form re-evaluated into the stochastic problem objective of the premium risk. The adapts of the conventional generic replication...

We study option pricing and hedging with uncertainty about a Black-Scholes reference model which is dynamically recalibrated to the market price of a liquidly traded vanilla option. For dynamic trading in the underlying asset and this vanilla option, delta-vega hedging is asymptotically optimal...

This paper provides a general characterization of subgame perfect equilibria for strategic timing problems, where two firms have the (real) option to make an irreversible investment. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market structure. The analysis is based directly on the inherent...

Firms frequently utilize multiple communications instruments as part of their marketing campaign. Interactions between these instruments suggest that firms should apply Integrated Marketing Communications (IMC) to benefit from the synergies. We review different IMC models and then present a...

Algorithmic traders acknowledge that their models are incorrectly specified, thus we allow for ambiguity in their choices to make their models robust to misspecification in: (i) the arrival rate of market orders (MOs), (ii) the fill probability of limit orders, and (iii) the dynamics of the...

We consider the strategic interaction of traders in a continuous-time financial market with Epstein-Zin-type recursive intertemporal preferences and performance concerns. We derive explicitly an equilibrium for the finite player and the mean-field version of the game, based on a study of...

In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a...

We examine the effect of payoff variations on cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemma games. We focus on three factors: risk, temptation, and efficiency, which we vary as orthogonal treatments. We find that temptation has the largest impact on cooperation. Temptation directly deters...