Banks face two different kinds of moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient 'pet' projects and consuming perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately...

Banks face two different kinds of moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects and consuming perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately...

We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting. However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank failures, regulators bail out creditors. Anticipation of this...

We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting. However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank failures, regulators bail out creditors. Anticipation of this...

We introduce heterogeneity in the pricing of aggregate risks of various persistence into a dynamic corporate finance model with financing frictions. We show that if long-term (persistent) shocks have a higher market price than short-term (temporary) shocks, firms shorten the horizon of corporate...

We explore the distinguishing characteristics of firms that completed or stopped their repurchase programs. Our findings help further understanding the economic reasons why firms would stop buybacks. Based on our international sample of 818 completed and 101 stopped share repurchase programs...

We study the interaction between firm uncertainty and corporate policies, emphasizing the role of asymmetries in the distribution of performance shocks. Conditional on volatility and other characteristics, firms with more negatively skewed performance shocks adopt more conservative policies,...

This paper investigates how firms manage their cash savings, financing, and investment when aggregate uncertainty is time-varying. I develop and estimate a dynamic model featuring aggregate uncertainty shocks, costly external financing, investment irreversibility, and time-varying risk premia....