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Corporate Risk : CEO Overconfidence and Incentive Compensation

Aabo, Tom; Hvistendahl, Nicholai Theodor; Kring, Jacob - 2021

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between corporate risk and the interaction between CEO incentive compensation and CEO overconfidence.Design/methodology/approach – This empirical study performs random and fixed effects regression analysis. It uses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251577

Discussion of "Uncertainty, investment, and managerial incentives" by Brent Glover and Oliver Levine

Gourio, François - In: Journal of monetary economics 69 (2015), pp. 138-142

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326671

Uncertainty, Investment, and Managerial Incentives

Glover, Brent - 2016

empirical relationship between uncertainty and investment. We develop a model in which the manager, compensated with an equity …-based contract, makes investment decisions for a firm that faces time-varying volatility. The contract creates incentives that affect … compensation data to quantify this predicted investment response for a large panel of firms. Our estimates help explain the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006231

Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties

Sung, Jaeyoung - In: Economic theory 74 (2022) 2, pp. 593-642

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013442066

Tournaments with gaps

Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511

Knight's "moral hazard" theory of organizacion

Barzel, Yoram - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 25 (1987) 1, pp. 117-120

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003483962

Double moral hazard and risk-sharing in construction projects

Shi, Lei; He, Yujia; Ōnishi, Masamitsu; Kobayashi, Kiyoshi - In: IEEE transactions on engineering management : EM 68 (2021) 6, pp. 1919-1929

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013188041

Salesforce contracting under uncertain demand and supply : double moral hazard and optimality of smooth contracts

Dai, Tinglong; Jerath, Kinshuk - In: Marketing science : the marketing journal of the … 38 (2019) 5, pp. 852-870

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012120920

An experimental investigation of the "tenuous trade-off" between risk and incentives in organizations

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Karakostas, Alexandros - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 88 (2020) 1, pp. 153-190

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237049

The Constant Relationship between Risk and Incentive in Optimal Incentive Contracts

Nanba, Toshihiko - 2019

It is s important for firms to choose appropriate performance measurements when they evaluate their employees' performance. In this paper, we examine the relationship between uncertainty and incentives in which the risk-averse agent has the specific knowledge. We show that uncertainty does not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862275

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