We study the optimal disclosure policy in security issuance using a Bayesian persuasion approach. An issuer designs a signal to persuade an investment bank to underwrite. The bank forms a posterior on the basis of the signal and makes its underwriting and retention decisions. When there is no...

Suppose that agents share risks in competitive markets. We show that better information makes everyone worse off if the economy has a representative agent-that is, the economy's demand for state contingent consumption equals the demand of a hypothetical agent who owns all the economy's wealth....

The value of information is examined in a risk-sharing environment with unawareness and complete markets. Information and awareness are symmetric among agents, who have a clear understanding of their actions and deterministic payoffs. We show with examples that public information can make some...

Suppose that agents share risks in competitive markets. We show that better information makes everyone worse off if the economy has a representative agent-that is, the economy's demand for state contingent consumption equals the demand of a hypothetical agent who owns all the economy's wealth....