We examine whether the economy can be insured against banking crises with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We study banking competition and show that the private sector insures the banking system through such contracts, and banking crises are avoided, provided that...

We examine financial intermediation when banks can offer deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We show that the risk allocation is efficient if there is no workout of banking crises. In this case, banks will shift part of the risk to depositors. In contrast, under a...

This paper documents the existence of primary dealers’ losses in Treasury bond markets and investigates how these losses a¤ect dealers’ market value. Using a novel data set that tracks more than 2,350 primary-to-secondary transactions, we find that bond losses for primary dealers are...

This paper studies contagion and market freezes caused by uncertainty in financial network structures and provides theoretical guidance for central banks. We establish a formal model to demonstrate that, in a financial system where financial institutions are interconnected, a negative shock to...