An emerging stream of literature investigates the impact of political uncertainty on financial markets. In this survey, we review this line of literature from four perspectives, namely, asset prices, corporate policies, financial intermediaries, and economy and households, suggesting that...

Changes in collateralization have been implicated in significant default (or near-default) events during the financial crisis, most notably with AIG. We have developed a framework for quantifying this effect based on moving between Merton-type and Black-Cox-type structural default models. Our...

Many regulations that affect firms and banks in the economy are based on size thresholds. We develop a model that shows that such regulations distort risk-taking incentives, providing above-threshold firms with greater incentives to take risk and below-threshold firms the opposite. Risk...

The incremental risk charge (IRC) is a new regulatory requirement from the Basel Committee in response to the recent financial crisis. Notably few models for IRC have been developed in the literature. This paper proposes a methodology consisting of two Monte Carlo simulations. The first Monte...

This article provides an in-depth analysis of the pricing and structuring of contingent convertibles (CoCos) with extension risk. Under the new regulatory Basel III framework, CoCo bonds can be categorised as either belonging to the Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital category. The Tier 1 CoCo...

This paper evaluates the model risk of models used for forecasting systemic and market risk. Model risk, which is the potential for different models to provide inconsistent outcomes, is shown to be increasing with market uncertainty. During calm periods, the underlying risk forecast models...

The financial crisis of 2008 focused increasing attention on corporate America and, in particular, the risk-taking behavior of large financial institutions. A growing appreciation of the “public” nature of the corporation resulted in a substantial number of high profile enforcement actions....

The central problem for financial regulation is reducing systemic risk. Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one significant institution can cause or significantly contribute to the failure of other significant institutions. This paper addresses the five most important policies for...

We show that any objective risk measurement algorithm mandated by central banks for regulated financial entities will result in more risk being taken on by those financial entities than would otherwise be the case. Furthermore, the risks taken on by the regulated financial entities are far more...

Banks face two different kinds of moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient 'pet' projects and consuming perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately...