Building upon Iossa and Martimort (2008), we study the main incentive issues and the form of optimal contracts for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in transports. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk-averse firm chooses unobservable efforts in...

The paper analyzes the service provision of infrastructure from the aspect of demand risk sharing. The society benefits more under the public-private partnership (PPP) than under government operation, because the government can transfer some risks to private firms through PPP. To reduce total...

When economic agents decide their optimal environmental behavior, they have to take into account non continuos evolutionary trends and irreversible changes characterising environmental phenomena. Given the still non perfect biophysical and economic knowledge, decisions have to be taken in an...

Consider legal uncertainty as uncertainty about the legality of a specific action. In particular, suppose that the threshold of legality is uncertain. I show that this legal uncertainty raises welfare. Legal uncertainty changes deterrence in opposite directions. The probability of conviction...

Consider legal uncertainty as uncertainty about the legality of a specific action. In particular, suppose that the threshold of legality is uncertain. I show that this legal uncertainty raises welfare. Legal uncertainty changes deterrence in opposite directions. The probability of conviction...

Most of the existing theories of international cooperation implicitly adopted the assumption that defection or cheating are easily detectable, either because the behavior of other actors is directly observable, or the payoffs received by the relevant actors are perfect indicators of past...