This paper studies the role of information acquisition in propagating/stabilizing uncertainty shocks in a dynamic financial market.In a static world, uncertainty raises the value of information, which encourages more information acquisition. In a dynamic world, however, uncertainty can depress...

The "quant crisis" of 2007 and subsequent unfolding of the global financial crisis highlighted the importance of the "crowded-trade" problem (not being able to know how many others are taking the same position). To investigate the crowded trading, we present a model in which informed and...

This paper analyzes costly information acquisition in asset markets with Knightian uncertainty about the asset fundamentals. In these markets, acquiring information not only reduces the expected variability of the fundamentals for a given distribution (i.e., risk). It also mitigates the...

Financial markets enable risk sharing and efficient allocation of capital. We characterize how these roles interact in a “feedback effects” model with diversely informed, risk-averse investors and a manager who learns from prices when making an investment decision. While learning from prices...

I investigate whether information quality affects the cost of equity capital through liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is the sensitivity of stock returns to unexpected changes in market liquidity; recent asset pricing literature has emphasized the importance of this systematic risk. I find that...

In a Kyle (1985) model, the sign of the correlation between a firm's debt and equity returns is the same as the sign of the cross-market Kyle's lambda. The sign is positive (negative) if private information concerns the mean (risk) of the firm's assets. We show empirically that information...

I analyze a monopolistic model of quality uncertainty but with the possibility of information acquisition on the consumer side. Information is costly and its amount is chosen by the consumer. The analysis of Bayesian equilibria shows the possibility of three equilibrium classes, only one of...

We study a monopoly insurance model with endogenous information acquisition. Through a continuous effort choice, consumers can determine the precision of a privately observed signal that is informative about their accident risk. The equilibrium effort is, depending on parameter values, either...

What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...

What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...