Showing 1 - 10 of 1,852
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By … combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive … relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383018
either increase or decrease with tenure. However, risk aversion and high persistence of ability call for a reduction in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876
both risk and loss averse, I show that if a penalty wage (i.e., a wage level at which the agent feels a substantial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012498375
This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent when the agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849217
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By … combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empiri- cal puzzle on the positive … relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264917
This paper revisits the normative properties of search-matching economies when homogeneous workers have concave utility functions and wages are bargained over. The optimal allocation of resources is characterized first when information is perfect and second when search effort is not observable....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276945
We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent's knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008662585
We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008662594
We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225898
We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137958