This paper is on decision theoretical foundations for various types of VaR models, including VaR and conditional-VaR, as objective measures of downside risk for financial prospects. We establish the connections of the VaRs with the first- and the second-order stochastic dominance investment...

In this paper it is shown that the combination of mental accounting and loss aversion can fundamentally changes people's way of evaluating risky alternatives. The observation is applied in a market setting: Parimutuel betting markets. In parimutuel betting markets it has been found that for...

Parimutuel betting markets are simplified financial markets, and can thus provide a clearer view of pricing issues which are more complicated elsewhere. Though empirical studies generally conclude that the parimutuel betting markets are surprisingly efficient, it is also found that for horses...

In this paper it is shown that the combination of mental accounting and loss aversion can fundamentally changes people's way of evaluating risky alternatives. The observation is applied in a market setting: Parimutuel betting markets. In parimutuel betting markets it has been found that for...

Expected utility functions are limited to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, while non-expected utility functions can exhibit either first-order or second-order (conditional) risk aversion. We extend the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion to orders of conditional dependent...

We consider the original Arrow-Lind framework in which a government undertakes a risky project to be shared among many taxpayers. In our model, the taxpayers decide the level of participation in the risky project. Moreover, the amount of taxes collected by the government fully finances the...

The term “equity premium puzzle” was coined in 1985 by economists Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott. The equity premium puzzle in considered one of the most significant questions in finance. A number of papers have explored the fundamental questions of why the premium exists and has not...

We consider the original Arrow-Lind framework in which a government undertakes a risky project to be shared among many taxpayers. In our model, the taxpayers decide the level of participation in the risky project. Moreover, the amount of taxes collected by the government fully finances the...

A stochastic solution is proposed for a general problem of demand for risks with both value-maximizing firms and risk averse agents. Explicit solutions are possible for both models when the interesting risk is perceived to be fairly-priced by the two decision makers