as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may …

degree of complexity by offering various levels of decision support. Our results show that the equivalence of the two auction …

In this paper we use an experiment to compare a theory of risk aversion and a theory of spite as an explanation for … overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and …. Indeed, we find that spite is a more convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not …

compared to any single-stage auction. Finally we derive the optimal efficient two-stage mechanism. …

behavior in the first-price auction, where both risk-aversion and loss aversion induce ‘overbidding.' We then show that the … nonparametric utility function and loss aversion coefficient are point-identified by the experiment data with exogenous variation in …

We compare two procurement mechanisms, bundling and unbundling, in a two-stage auction model with risk-averse suppliers …. They differ in whether two sequential tasks of investment and production are procured through a single auction or two … sequential auctions. Each auction adopts a first-price format. A winner is awarded a fixed-price contract. Each supplier …

point due to updated information about others' values (i.e., the own winning probability) during the course of the auction …, and make optimal binary decisions at each price (approve or quit in the English auction and wait or bid in the Dutch … auction). First, we solve for personal equilibrium profiles, i.e., profiles of bids that contain for each bidder a bidding …