We investigate the possibility of enhancing efficiency by awarding premiums to a set of highest bidders in an English auction - in a setting that extends Maskin and Riley (1984, Econometrica 52: 1473-1518) in three aspects: (i) the seller can be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have...

Procurement auctions are sometimes plagued with a chosen supplier's failing to accomplish a project successfully. The risk of project failure is considerable, especially when the buyer has inadequate information about suppliers ex ante and the project can only be evaluated at the end. To manage...

We investigate the possibility of enhancing efficiency by awarding premiums to a set of highest bidders in an English auction - in a setting that extends Maskin and Riley (1984, Econometrica 52: 1473-1518) in three aspects: (i) the seller can be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have...